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# Review of GGGI Programme in Indonesia (2012-2017)

Final Report

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# Executive Summary

**The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) has operated in Indonesia since 2013 and its country programme is fully funded by Norway. This report presents a high-level review of achievements so far.**

GGGI is an inter-governmental organisation dedicated to promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth in developing countries and emerging economies. It is headquartered in Seoul and has operations in 26 countries. Norway has supported the organisation globally from the start, both via core funding and direct funding of country operations. Indonesia is a founding member of GGGI and its largest programme. It is currently exclusively funded by Norway, via Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)<sup>1</sup>. LTS has been asked by Norad to carry out a review of the GGGI Indonesia programme from its inception in 2013 until June 2017. The programme has run in two phases: Phase 1 from 2013-15 and Phase 2 from 2016-19, with a total budget allocation of NOK 234m (approximately USD 30m).

**GGGI's mission in Indonesia 'makes sense' but is in no way a guaranteed success.** Indonesia has the world's third largest area of rainforest but also a history of extracting wealth from its natural resources without much concern for the environmental consequences. After peat fires ravaged the country in 2015, it has gradually been waking up to the fact that the damage caused by monocultural oil palm plantations and the draining of peat lands represent not just a threat to global efforts to slow climate change but also to local prospects for economic growth and prosperity. There is therefore a real need for revolutionary 'green' thinking in Indonesia and the relevance of an organisation such as GGGI is potentially high. However, strong countervailing forces exist. They include the interests of private individuals and businesses who lobby for continued concessions in the mining and land use sector, political leaders both at national and sub-national levels who are under pressure to show short-term results for economic growth and poverty reduction, and a lack of understanding of and support for environmental issues in the population. GGGI's mission is also hampered by the sheer scale of the challenge: some political wins at the sub-national level or the successful submission of a pre-feasibility study are but drops in the ocean when considering the vast size of the country and the number of sectors that are in need of 'greening'.

**GGGI seeks to create a green growth paradigm for the Indonesian Government to use in all its planning activities and they have had some success with this at sub-national levels.** GGGI's Indonesia programme is designed to support the government in mainstreaming green growth in its economic planning processes. They do this by creating awareness of the benefits of green growth, producing tools for the

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<sup>1</sup> Apart from direct funding from GGGI HQ for feasibility studies (amounting to almost USD 0.5 Million in the period 2016-17)

government to use in planning processes (such as eCBA – an extended cost-benefit analysis tool which includes the social and environmental impacts of projects), training government officials and, more recently, by supporting the development of ‘green’ projects. The GGGI team is adept at carrying out these activities and clearly has a good understanding of the needs of the Indonesian government. There is evidence to indicate that GGGI’s efforts are making headway at the district and provincial levels, for instance through the inclusion of green growth approaches in development plans. At the national level, however, policies and tools have been much more difficult to influence and GGGI’s work at this level still has a long way to go.

**In terms of programmatic achievement, GGGI Indonesia has produced outputs but struggles to achieve impact at the outcome level. In Phase 1 this was partly because of overly optimistic targets.**

Key outputs in Phase I were the Green Growth Roadmap for Policy, Planning and Investment, and the eCBA tool and handbook. These have been introduced to government officials at various levels but their full implementation (through, e.g., mandatory processes) is still lacking. Other outcomes were doomed from the start: as an example, it was probably over optimistic to aim for *strengthened green growth performance of projects and investments*, when the programme was only just introducing the green growth concept to its audience. Phase 2 activities have included the production of several feasibility studies and continued support for regional development and energy plans. Most of the outputs are ‘on track’ and when there have been delays they have, for the most part, been due to sluggishness within the Indonesian Government. The planned Outcomes for Phase 2 seem more realistic than those for Phase 1 and since the programme still has two years (at least) to run, they have a reasonable chance of being achieved.

**Norway’s decision to fund GGGI at the scale that it did in December 2012 was arguably premature.**

GGGI did not have a track record – internationally or locally – and some of the challenges it encountered in Phase 1 could probably have been predicted and mitigated if a proper assessment had been undertaken at the outset. It is understood that the decision to fund GGGI Indonesia was part of a broader political endorsement by Norway of GGGI globally and that it went ahead despite serious reservations by the Embassy (especially the Counsellor). The large amount of funding may in part explain the overly optimistic outcomes GGGI then set itself to achieve. A better reasoned and more gradual deployment of funds might have achieved greater results and created fewer frustrations.

**The greatest risk to GGGI’s programme in Phase 2 is the potential failure to effectively penetrate the Government of Indonesia at the highest levels.** The growth model that Indonesia follows in the coming decades will be determined by the mindset of the president and the most important line ministries, including the Ministry of Finance. It follows that GGGI will only succeed in its mission if it achieves influence at the highest levels of government. On this account, GGGI’s record so far is mixed and, despite their best efforts, there is no indication at the moment that the team will succeed. Two features of GGGI Indonesia are creating challenges in the process: one is the link of GGGI to the previous government (operations commenced under the former president who subsequently took on a role in GGGI globally) and the other is the perception of GGGI as a ‘foreign entity’ with no deep-rooted legitimacy in the country.

**GGGI's project-level support is popular but it is not clear if this is the best use of the organisation's resources.** In Phase 2, several of the activities are geared towards producing 'bankable projects'. This has entailed the commissioning of feasibility studies on sustainable energy technologies and commodity supply chains. GGGI's government partners are clearly supportive of these activities and underline that much more funding in this area is needed. GGGI argues that showing concrete evidence of profitable, sustainable, projects is an effective way of convincing government officials of the merits of green growth. However, it is not clear to the review team that this is a logical step for GGGI. A project-level focus seems at odds with the organisation's original mission of changing the mindset of political leaders and civil servants, who fundamentally require targeted advocacy and policy advice. There exists a vast body of literature internationally on the business case for sustainable commodities and renewable energy and GGGI should not have to re-produce this type of evidence. Also, if it is felt that evidence specific to the Indonesian context is needed, there should be other sources of funding (UNDP, GCF and World Bank to name a few) available for these activities. GGGI's niche is to be a 'high-level thinker' and it should be able to relay more detailed studies to others.

**The GGGI Indonesia programme is well managed.** Its operations appear to be effectively run by a small but expanding team. It hires consultants for many activities but all work streams are managed in-house. GGGI staff seem to be well qualified for their jobs and activities are well organised and well understood by GGGI staff and Gol partners. The relationship with the Norwegian Embassy is close and communication frequent.

**GGGI's programme is of high relevance to the Indonesian government, but it is less focused on the forest and land-use sector than initially intended. This creates some tension with the mandate of its funding partner NICFI.** Indonesia has committed to reduce its GHG emissions by 29% against a business as usual scenario by 2030. These emission reductions will require significant cuts in the forest and land use and energy sectors - priority areas in GGGI's work programme in Phase 2. Relevance to Indonesia's needs thus seems assured and is further enhanced by having GGGI's activities (at least in Phase 2) be 'demand-driven' (based on requests from the Gol). However, GGGI's activities have developed over time from a focus on green growth and forest and land-use to include also the energy sector and special economic zones (SEZ; in the latest budget, only about 30% of the funding was intended for outputs directly related to forest and land-use). This was not the original intention of the agreement with Norway and can possibly be seen to be in conflict with the narrower objectives of NICFI. From a programme supervision perspective, it also poses some challenges as the Embassy seems less interested in monitoring progress on energy and SEZ.

**GGGI's approach to collaboration with the Indonesian government has several features of 'best practice'.** These include GGGI's principle of embedding staff in line ministries – which, although perhaps not yet proven to work, at least appeals intuitively – and of deliberately working with government officials at several levels in order to increase effectiveness and reduce the risks from staff turnover.

**Based on lessons from five years of collaboration, we recommend that the Embassy and GGGI remain vigilant about the direction of the programme and realistic about the outcomes that can be achieved.** GGGI's differentiating feature – setting it apart from the UNDP, bilateral donors, NGOs and international financial institutions – is its mission to change the direction of growth of a country. This feature requires a tailored approach, different from that followed by most other organisations. Hence, we would encourage GGGI and the Embassy to discuss whether to continue funding individual project feasibility studies or if perhaps a programmatic project preparation facility would be more effective<sup>2</sup>. The opportunity to offload this workstream to other donors or partners should also be considered. Most importantly, GGGI has to intensify efforts to penetrate the highest echelons of the Indonesian government. Without effective access to this level of influence, GGGI is likely to fail in its mission in Indonesia.

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<sup>2</sup> Project preparation facilities are common among international financial institutions (GCF, EBRD, WB to name a few) and provide streamlined processes for project development.



# Table of Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF REVIEW .....</b>	<b>1</b>
	Table 1: Year of Norway's funding decisions and amounts (MNOK).....	2
	Table 2: GGGI Indonesia's funding, by donor share 2013-16 .....	2
<b>2</b>	<b>APPROACH OF REVIEW TEAM .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>ACHIEVEMENT OF RESULTS .....</b>	<b>5</b>
3.1	PHASE 1: 2013 TO 2015.....	5
3.2	PHASE 2: 2016 TO 2017 .....	6
3.2.1	<i>Energy</i> .....	7
3.2.2	<i>Special Economic Zones</i> .....	8
3.2.3	<i>Land use and forestry</i> .....	9
3.2.1	<i>Cross-cutting activities</i> .....	10
<b>4</b>	<b>SUSTAINABILITY .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>EFFICIENCY .....</b>	<b>12</b>
5.1	GGGI'S ABILITY TO CONVERT INPUTS INTO OUTPUTS .....	12
5.2	BENEFIT OF GGGI INDONESIA BEING PART OF A GLOBAL INSTITUTION .....	12
5.3	THE ABILITY OF THE INDONESIA OFFICE TO CONVERT OUTPUTS INTO TANGIBLE OUTCOMES .....	13
<b>6</b>	<b>MANAGEMENT CAPACITY .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>RESULTS MANAGEMENT .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>8</b>	<b>COORDINATION .....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>RISK MANAGEMENT .....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>RELEVANCE.....</b>	<b>20</b>
10.1	IS THE GGGI PROGRAMME CONSISTENT WITH INDONESIA'S REQUIREMENTS AT THE NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL LEVELS? .....	20
10.2	IS THE GGGI PROGRAMME CONSISTENT WITH THE PRIORITIES OF NICFI? .....	20
10.3	HOW DOES THE PROGRAM CONTRIBUTE TO THE OBJECTIVES OF INDONESIA'S REDD+ STRATEGY? .....	21
<b>11</b>	<b>GENDER.....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>12</b>	<b>CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....</b>	<b>24</b>
	<b>ANNEX 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE .....</b>	<b>27</b>

BACKGROUND .....	27
<i>The GoI-GGGI Collaboration</i> .....	27
OBJECTIVES OF THE REVIEW.....	29
SCOPE OF WORK .....	29
IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH .....	30
<i>Desk Review</i> .....	30
<i>Field Visit</i> .....	30
<i>Timetable for preparation, fieldwork and reporting</i> .....	30
BUDGET.....	31
<b>ANNEX 2: LIST OF INTERVIEWS</b> .....	<b>32</b>
<b>ANNEX 3</b> .....	<b>35</b>
Table 3 Budget and actual spending GGGI, year-on/year.....	35
<b>REFERENCES</b> .....	<b>36</b>

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# 1 Background and Purpose of Review

**The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) is an international inter-governmental organisation promoting green growth with operations in Indonesia since 2013.** GGGI is dedicated to promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth in developing countries and emerging economies. The mission of GGGI is a global transition toward a model of green growth, which will simultaneously achieve poverty reduction, social inclusion, environmental sustainability, and economic growth. The four thematic areas of GGGI are water & sanitation, sustainable energy, sustainable landscapes and green cities. It currently has programmes of operations in 26 countries and is headquartered in Seoul, South Korea. Indonesia is its largest country programme.

GGGI works directly with governments by supporting their planning capabilities. In recent years it has started offering more implementation-oriented activities as well, such as investment support and financing advice. GGGI staff are typically 'embedded' in line ministries and support their government partners on a demand-driven basis. This implies that the sectors GGGI provides support to can vary from country to country, depending on the priorities of the host government.

GGGI has been active in Indonesia since 2013. The president in Indonesia at the time, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), was instrumental in the establishment of the organisation, and was President of its governing council in the period September 2014-December 2016.

**GGGI's mission is very relevant to Indonesia's environmental and economic situation, but it is operating in a challenging political context.** Indonesia is a middle-income country and the world's 4<sup>th</sup> most populous, with an economy which relies heavily on the production of raw materials such as palm oil, rubber, and hydrocarbons. Deforestation and peat fires have led to international attention around the role of Indonesia's forests in combating climate change, including a promised fund of USD 1 billion from Norway to be disbursed in exchange for verified emission reductions. Political attention given to green issues is increasing, no doubt influenced by recent findings that the economy is suffering as a result of the unsustainable depletion of the country's resources (Indonesia's GDP growth in 2015 was reported to be 2% lower than predicted due to peat fires). The current Government (led by president Jokowi) is seen as broadly supportive of the agenda of green growth. However, countervailing forces exist and the pressure on elected officials to produce short-term economic growth opportunities is significant. It is important to recognise that GGGI ultimately operates in a very political context: the relevance and effectiveness of GGGI's programme in Indonesia is, and will continue to be, affected by the support it receives from the current Government and any perceived political affiliations with previous governments which may work in its disfavour.

**GGGI's work programme aims to help the Indonesian government carry out green growth strategies. Norway has been funding the organisation from the start.** The objectives of GGGI's programme in Phase 1, covering the years 2013-15 (inclusive), were to set up operations, establish relationships with the Government of Indonesia (GoI), introduce tools for green growth planning and build green growth capabilities

in the Indonesian administration. Phase 2 is designed to run from 2016 until the end of 2019 with the objectives of continuing to mainstream green growth planning tools but also, increasingly, to assist the GoI with the implementation of green growth concepts through the development of concrete project opportunities. GGGI assistance is provided through the development of tools – such as the extended cost-benefit analysis tool (eCBA), the training of government staff in how to use these tools, thematic workshops on particular topics – such as opportunities in special economic zones (SEZ), and in the last year the development of feasibility studies and pre-feasibility studies for project opportunities in the energy and land-use sector.

GGGI's focal point is the Ministry of National Development Planning, Bappenas. Key implementing partners include the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), the Ministries of Planning at provincial and district levels (Bappeda), the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs (CMEA), the newly created peat restoration agency (BRG), the National Institute for Public Administration (LAN), ESDM and PT SMI. All activities are coordinated through Bappenas. GGGI staff, of which there are some 23 at present, consist of a country representative, programme manager, portfolio managers, technical staff and administration staff. GGGI staff have the management responsibility for each workstream but rely on consultants to carry out a significant portion of the technical work.

The Government of Norway decided to fund GGGI Indonesia in December 2012 and has committed a total of NOK 233.6m in four funding cycles since then, as illustrated by Table 1.

**Table 1: Year of Norway's funding decisions and amounts (MNOK)**

2012	2015	2016	2017	Total
35.6	20	170	8	<b>233.6</b>

As Table 2 shows, apart from some funding from headquarters in the first two years ('core funding'), Norway has been funding GGGI Indonesia on an exclusive basis from the outset.

**Table 2: GGGI Indonesia's funding, by donor share 2013-16**

Description	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Share of Norway grant	78%	92%	100%	100%	100%
Share of core funding	22%	8%	0%	0%	0%

Within the current agreement, GGGI Indonesia's operations are funded until the end of 2019. Due to a slow start to Phase 2, there is likely to be a no-cost extension to the agreement so that operations will continue with Norwegian funds for a while longer. GGGI is envisaging a continuation of operations in Indonesia beyond 2019. It is our understanding that several donors have been approached as part of a donor diversification drive to fund future operations, and that there is no expectation that Norway will continue funding beyond the current period.

**The purpose of this review is to assess Phase 1 and Phase 2, up to June 2017, in terms of how well the programme has performed against 11 criteria** - covering issues such as efficiency and lessons learned (the terms of reference are attached in Annex 1)<sup>3</sup>. A mid-term review of Phase 1 was undertaken in December 2014. As Norway is not currently considering extending its funding beyond the current funding phase, it is our understanding that the review will be used to assess performance as a matter of good management practice and as input to the Embassy's monitoring of Phase 2. We hope that it can be of use in future assessments of Norway's funding of GGGI in other countries as well, as some of our findings might be considered generic and hence applicable to GGGI more generally.

The chapters are organised according to the criteria in the Terms of Reference, starting out with an assessment of achievement of results.

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<sup>3</sup> Note that we are not explicitly discussing the issue of human rights. This issue was marked with a question mark ('relevant?') in the ToR and upon consultation with the Embassy it was agreed that the issue does not have any direct relevance for the GGGI-Norway cooperation, other than to note that human rights is an important dimension of the Embassy's as well as GGGI's risk management procedures.

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## 2 Approach of Review Team

The review team consisted of three members: a team leader and two team members with relevant Indonesian forest sector experience. The team was hired through Norad's framework agreement with LTS International.

Based on the ToR, the team spent a week undertaking document review before two of the team members travelled to Jakarta for meetings. The meetings were prioritised and agreed with the Norwegian Embassy and set up with the help of GGGI Indonesia. The team also carried out field interviews in Central Kalimantan and conducted phone interviews with GGGI's representative in East Kalimantan and a number of other organisations (partners of GGGI as well as external stakeholders). The list of interviewees is provided in Annex 2. A debrief providing the team's initial findings was held in Jakarta immediately following the meetings. This report was put together in the week after the team's return.

This review can be characterised as a summary-level review. The terms of reference cover standard criteria used for evaluations, but the time made available to the team was very limited and hence the level of depth to which each criterion could be assessed was set accordingly.

## 3 Achievement of Results

### 3.1 Phase 1: 2013 to 2015

**Phase 1 contributed to mainstreaming of green growth into district- and provincial-level planning and built capacity to implement green growth plans at sub-national government levels. Most of the outputs GGGI planned for were produced. However, the outcomes aimed for in Phase 1 were not achieved in the time frame aimed for and will need ongoing support in Phase 2 and beyond.**

The Green Growth Programme Phase I ran from 2013 to 2015 and had five outcome objectives:

- A. Green growth approach mainstreamed into planning and investment decision-making processes.
- B. Strengthened green growth performance of projects and investments.
- C. Accelerated disbursement of funding to REDD+ projects which catalyse green growth.
- D. Strengthen capacity at national and subnational level to implement key pilots in the short term.
- E. Enhanced capability at national and subnational government to put together a green growth programme at scale in the medium and long term.

**It is our understanding that green growth tools and approaches have been well received by government departments and have been used at provincial levels, even if they currently are adopted on a voluntary rather than mandatory basis.** Key outputs from Phase I were the production and dissemination of a Green Growth Roadmap for Policy, Planning and Investment (*Delivering Green Growth for a Prosperous Indonesia: A Roadmap for Policy, Planning and Investment*) and an extended cost benefit assessment (eCBA) tool and handbook. The extended cost-benefit analysis (eCBA) is a public policy and planning tool that combines economic appraisal with environmental and social assessment with the aim of assessing sustainability as well as the business case of proposed projects. It continues to be a key GGGI tool in Phase 2 as well.

The eCBA tools were received by government departments and applied by GGGI in several case studies. They have also been applied at district- and provincial levels in East Kalimantan where they have contributed to the province's Masterplan for a Green Economy. However, eCBA tools have not yet been adopted as standard mandatory procedures by any government departments. Work towards achieving this goal continues to be a key focus in Phase 2.

GGGI's support has helped integrate green growth into district- and provincial-level planning documents. At the sub-national level, GGGI capacity building activities and technical support helped to incorporate green growth into district-level regional mid-term development plans (RPJMD) in East Kalimantan, and provincial- and district-level RPJMDs in Central Kalimantan. Phase 1 laid the groundwork for mainstreaming green growth into national planning and decision-making processes, but the formal adoption of approaches such as eCBA is likely to take some time since there are a number of barriers to overcome including the perception

that use of these tools could prove costly and discourage investment. Efforts to synergise green growth with other national initiatives such as emissions reduction programmes and approaches such as strategic environmental assessment could facilitate adoption at the national level.

**Training and capacity building activities have helped strengthen government departments and provided examples relevant to green growth planning and implementation but impact on performance has not yet been demonstrated.**

Case studies and technical documents produced in Phase 1, in combination with provision of training sessions, direct support, and briefing papers are likely to have strengthened the capacity of government departments at national and sub-national levels and have the potential to help strengthen green growth performance of projects and investments - but these have not yet been implemented.

**REDD+ is probably the area that proved the most disappointing in Phase 1, for reasons beyond the control of GGGI.** GGGI contributed to the production of a provincial-level proposal for REDD+ activities, an Emission Reduction Project Idea Note for East Kalimantan, and produced a Selection Framework for REDD+ investments which we understand were used by the REDD+ agency before its dissolution. The reorganisation of the Government's REDD+ activities in 2014 produced a significant slow-down and a fair amount of confusion, neither of which helped GGGI's ability to achieve its REDD+ related targets. The REDD+ products developed in Phase 1 have been received by MoEF but it is unclear how actively they are being used by current staff.

**The reasons for the failure to achieve the outcomes of Phase 1 lie in a combination of a slow start to the programme as well as a sluggish response by the GoI.** The outcomes aimed for in Phase 1 were very optimistic, hence to a large extent the likelihood to fail<sup>4</sup> to reach them was factored into the programme from the beginning. Moreover, GGGI Indonesia underestimated the time required to set up operations and build relationships with the Government. The reorganisation of REDD+ activities by the Government also exacerbated the challenges. The GGGI team appears to have learned from the experience as the programme (and Logframe) developed for Phase 2 were both more realistic and detailed.

## 3.2 Phase 2: 2016 to 2017

**An assessment of the first two years of Phase 2 shows progress being made at the sub-national levels and in relation to specific project opportunities, but national level results have still not**

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<sup>4</sup> The term 'fail' is used here as a technical term to describe the failure to achieve the outcome within the timeframe planned for, and not as a value judgement of GGGI's operations more broadly.



**materialised and there is reason to be sceptical about the ability of GGGI to achieve them in the remaining two years of the programme.**

Phase 2 of the Green Growth Programme started in 2015 and will run until the end of 2019. The intended Outcomes of Phase 2 are:

1. Green growth plans and strategies related to energy, special economic zones, forest and land-based mitigation, and across sectors are adopted by the relevant Indonesian government authorities.
2. A systematic enabling approach to encourage green investment is adopted by the relevant Indonesian government authorities.
3. Increased green investment is directed to focal sectors.
4. A Green Growth Secretariat supports well informed national and sub-national decision makers within capable institutions to understand, replicate, and scale up green growth approaches.

This section describes progress towards these outcomes for each of the focal areas identified for Phase 2 (Energy, Special Economic Zones, Land Use and Forestry, and Cross-Cutting Issues).

### 3.2.1 Energy

**National support for a renewable energy policy has so far not materialised, but progress has been made on including renewable energy options in provincial level energy plans and GGGI assistance has been provided for several feasibility studies.**

**GGGI has facilitated revision of provincial energy plans in Central and East Kalimantan.** Scoping studies produced by GGGI and technical support, training and capacity building activities have facilitated the governments of East and Central Kalimantan to update their provincial energy plans (RUED), and the Central Kalimantan Provincial Electricity Master Plan (RKUD). The focus is now on the formal adoption of these plans so that sub-national budgets can be allocated to developing renewable energy technologies.

**Policy instruments to encourage investment in green energy have not yet been developed because of slow progress caused by the restructuring of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM).** Some progress has been made in 2017, however, so that GGGI now has a revised work plan with the Ministry. GGGI has also worked with the state-owned infrastructure investment corporation PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur (PT SMI) to identify enabling policies for renewable energy implementation, assess solar photovoltaic procurement options, and develop a concept note on Solar Photovoltaic Development in Papua and Maluku Provinces.

**Support for feasibility studies of renewable energy projects has led to some progress for photovoltaic hybrid options while technologies based on palm oil effluent have proven unviable under the current regulatory regime.** A study conducted in partnership with the East Nusa Tenggara provincial government to assess a hybrid system connecting solar photovoltaic plants to existing diesel-powered grids at eight locations on five islands was found to be financially viable, and a private investor has expressed interest in developing the project. However, pre-feasibility studies supported by GGGI for projects

to capture methane from palm oil mill effluent (POME) for use in energy generation demonstrated that regulatory changes have reduced the financial viability of these projects.

**Difficulties securing industry commitment to Industrial Grade Audits has created delays in support to implementation of energy efficiency measures by state owned and private companies in East Kalimantan.** A lack of buy-in from senior management of the companies was identified as the cause, but progress is reportedly being made on this issue after intervention from the Ministry.

**GGGI's ability to make headway in the energy sector has been hampered by organisational and administrative challenges.** The reorganisation of ESDM, compounded by an inability of GGGI to establish a productive working relationship with staff at the Ministry, has made progress at the national level challenging. The relationship has since been re-established but it has nevertheless impacted GGGI's ability to achieve its energy related targets in the time frame planned for.

### 3.2.2 Special Economic Zones

**Special Economic Zones can provide an arena for demonstrating green growth tools. However, securing national-level support for mandatory guidelines still has some way to go and progress with GGGI's work plan in this area is likely to be slow.**

Special Economic Zones are often used by emerging economies to distribute economic growth away from the capital and industrialise certain sectors through the granting of tailored enabling regulatory frameworks and infrastructure. Indonesia currently has 12 SEZs and at the beginning of Phase 2 GGGI was asked by the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs (CMEA) to channel some of its work to Sei Mangkei (North Sumatra), a centre for palm oil and rubber processing, and Mandalika (Lombok).

**So far, in terms of GGGI's work, a draft SEZ handbook and policy has been produced and training workshops on eCBA have been conducted with CMEA staff and stakeholders in SEZ Sei Mangkei.**

The SEZ guidelines are under development. Activities that are expected to lead to the development of guidelines and that have been agreed on include: i) scope of work agreed for a study to assess the feasibility of installing a hazardous waste treatment plant in Northern Sumatra, ii) a policy brief on the renewable energy sector, and iii) fiscal and investment policy recommendations and de-risking instruments to support green SEZ projects. Moreover, GGGI has completed a business case study for rooftop solar in SEZ Sei Mangkei, and feasibility studies for a solar photovoltaic plant in SEZ Mandalika. Development of the photovoltaic plant in Mandalika is being pursued by the Indonesian Tourism Development Cooperation and the national infrastructure investment company (PT SMI) has suggested they may be willing to provide debt to the project. Additional pre-feasibility studies have been planned but not yet carried out.

**It is not clear that the strategy of pursuing project level work will lead to the required changes at the policy level.** The idea behind pursuing feasibility studies in this context is that they can demonstrate the positive investment case that can be made for green technologies and hence help convert those who think there is necessarily a trade-off between economic growth and sustainability. However, only if the results of

these case studies are joined up and presented as a cohesive narrative to ministers are they likely to achieve that goal. The risk is that GGGI carries out these studies but fails to produce enough evidence for this narrative within a reasonable time frame. Furthermore, even when SEZ guidelines have been developed, they will only have an impact once they have been turned into SEZ strategic documents – a step which requires their formal adoption. Both CMEA and GGGI recognise that further support will be required to overcome concerns from the National Council for Special Economic Zones over the potential negative impacts on investments from applying green growth planning tools.

### 3.2.3 Land use and forestry

**Despite some progress at the provincial level (East Kalimantan), outputs linked to jurisdictional approaches to REDD+ have been delayed because of a lack of official adoption of this approach at the national level. GGGI support to the land-use and forestry sector has otherwise been quite successful at the sub-national levels and included strengthening local government capacity, the integration of forest management elements in regional development plans and feasibility studies for sustainable commodity supply chains.**

**GGGI has provided support for the development of Regional Medium-Term Development Plans which integrate green growth plans and strategies relating to forest and land-based mitigation.** Technical recommendations from GGGI have been incorporated into the Central Kalimantan Regional Medium-Term Development Plan for 2016 to 2021. Ongoing support is planned for development of East Kalimantan's Medium-Term Development Plan for 2019 to 2023, and to support development of sectoral plans in East Kalimantan districts, and Murung Raya and Pulang Pisau (Central Kalimantan). Once integrated in development plans, budgets will be allocated from the provincial governments. This budget-allocation feature is positive as it provides a mechanism for 'locking in' green growth and thus creating long term impact from GGGI's assistance.

**There has been progress in developing a draft Emissions Reduction Program Document (ERPD) for East Kalimantan, but challenges remain.** The ERPD has just been submitted and will allow Indonesia to tap into the results-based funding from the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). Significant technical work has been completed, with GGGI's assistance. However, success will depend on progress with Government processes on MRV and other issues which are moving slowly. Development of policy instruments related to a jurisdictional approach are on hold pending support for jurisdictional approaches, beyond the ERPD for East Kalimantan, from the Directorate General of Climate Change (MoEF).

**One proposal for a forest and land based GHG-reducing project has been finalised, and others are in development. If successful, they may contribute toward achieving the outcome of increased investments to focal sectors.** Four project concept note including initial financial models have been completed (three based on commodity supply chains and one on multiple-use forest management); and a fifth project concept note, based on a landscape approach to peat restoration with carbon finance, is near

completion. One of these concept notes has been developed into a full investment proposal for sustainable palm oil supply chains; the other four proposals are in development. For several of the commodity-related feasibility studies, GGGI is collaborating with the Peatland Restoration Agency (BRG). Indeed, BRG is becoming an increasingly important partner for GGGI, as they have a common mandate to develop public-private investment opportunities for peatland restoration – including research into commodities that are suitable for restored peatlands. Whether the efforts dedicated to producing feasibility studies will pay off in terms of outcome GGGI is aiming for will, however, depend on how successful the concepts turn out to be. This in turn calls for robust screening of project opportunities at the initial stages so that only the commodities and technologies with a high probability of success (including ability to access markets) are chosen for further study.

### 3.2.1 Cross-cutting activities

**Training in the application of green growth tools is carried out with GGGI's partners at all levels of government on an ad-hoc basis but the newly formed partnership with LAN will make training more systematic.** There has been high demand for eCBA workshops in Phase 2 and trainings have been conducted with the Government's plantation agency in East Kalimantan, the National Institute of Public Administration, and the state-owned infrastructure investment corporation PT SMI. A more systematic approach to capacity development is now under development through a partnership with the National Institute of Public Administration (LAN), the Indonesian Government agency charged with training civil servants. It is too early to tell whether this partnership and approach to capacity development will be a success, but it seems sensible to integrate, embed and ultimately create ownership to the green growth agenda from within the Government.

**To improve dissemination of green growth ideas and tools, GGGI and GoI agreed to the creation of a Green Growth Secretariat.** A lack of previous exposure to green growth concepts was an early barrier to adoption of the GGGI approaches and recommendations. As a result, the Secretariat was established under the leadership of Bappenas as a 'clearinghouse for knowledge solutions' and appears to have accelerated the diffusion of knowledge about green growth tools and frameworks, even if collaboration with some important players (for instance, the Ministry of Finance) still remains in its infancy.

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## 4 Sustainability

**It is too early to tell whether the GGGI Indonesia programme will have lasting benefits. Although GGGI's Government partners appear to feel ownership to the green growth paradigm, many parts of the Government are not yet participating and external (political) forces may still overturn the progress that has been made. GGGI's work thus needs both expansion and consolidation and GoI is likely to require external assistance for several years to come.**

GGGI Indonesia's operations are funded by the Norwegian Government until the end of 2019. Due to delays in disbursing the funds, there is likely to be a no-cost extension so that operations will continue somewhat longer with the current funding. Beyond 2020, GGGI is envisaging a continuation of operations in Indonesia, albeit at a reduced scale. The team is currently receiving support from GGGI HQ as part of a donor diversification drive to seek funding beyond 2019. It is the opinion of the review team that obtaining funding for a continued presence will be crucial to ensure the legacy and impacts of GGGI's current activities.

Both GGGI and GoI are clear that they see a need to continue their collaboration beyond the current period. Despite the good intentions of many branches of the Indonesian government, 'green growth' is by no means an assured outcome in the country over the coming years. A number of countervailing forces – such as pressure to continue opening up land to mining concessions and demands for continued electrification by way of cheap coal-fired power – serve to make the job of greening the economy more challenging. These pressures manifest themselves in the political uncertainty that comes with changes in leadership at the national and sub-national levels in the electoral cycle. Currently, there is support for 'green thinking' both from President Jokowi and from the Governors of Central and East Kalimantan. However, the upcoming election in East Kalimantan has been identified by GGGI and the Embassy as having potential to derail the significant achievements made in the Province.

Moreover, Indonesia's 'journey' to green growth seems to only just have begun. GGGI's programme was off to a slow start and progress has been slower than envisaged in Phase 2 as well. The slow pace is mostly a result of the wishes or needs of the GoI, with GGGI adapting its activities accordingly. However, the mainstreaming of green growth thinking in Indonesia has a long way to go, both sector wise (urban infrastructure, for instance, is still not part of the green growth platform) and geographically (GGGI has, rightly, focused only on two priority pilot provinces so far). GGGI's Government partners seem to understand the idea of green growth well and have internalised several of the tools which will enable them to be in the 'driving seat' of a green growth programme, but these partners represent only a small part of the Government establishment. The fact that the Ministry of Finance has not been engaged properly so far means that the country's macroeconomic vision does not contain the green growth narrative. This seems like an important omission. For the green growth philosophy to become a lasting legacy, it is likely to need reinforcement and external support for several years to come.

## 5 Efficiency

### 5.1 GGGI's ability to convert inputs into outputs

**GGGI Indonesia appears to be an efficiently run operation, with funding of activities in both phases progressing well after a lag in the initial stages.**

In Phase 1 the programme spent USD 5.4m (85% of the budget allocated) and delivered all of the planned outputs. However, since some of these outputs are yet to be fully integrated into district and national planning processes, and the capacity building achieved by training activities has not been assessed, Phase 1 outcomes are still pending. As for Phase 2, up to June 2017 USD 6.4m was spent, amounting to 80% of the allocated budget for that period. The production of outputs appears to be on track, but it is still too early to assess whether achievements will be made at the Outcome level.

When there have been delays in the programme, they have usually been due to decisions by the Government to proceed more slowly. Examples include the slow progress towards the national introduction of the MRV system related to REDD+ and some activities related to the SEZs (Phase 2 Outputs 1.2 and 2.2).

In both phases, GGGI seems to have struggled to deploy resources in initial years: in 2013, only 43% of the allocated budget was spent, while the figure for the same year in Phase 2 was 64%. GGGI is clear that in its first year of operation it struggled to find its feet, being a new organisation and having to build relationships and activities from zero. It is our understanding that in Phase 2 the slow take-off was due to a combination of difficulties in finding the right staff (in some cases several hiring rounds were necessary) and external factors such as a slow response from the Government of Indonesia to proposed activities. Given that such sluggishness might have been expected, based on the experience of Phase 1, it would seem that GGGI in Phase 2 should have been able to budget and plan more realistically.

### 5.2 Benefit of GGGI Indonesia being part of a global institution

**GGGI Indonesia has, over the years, benefited from extensive technical and operational support from GGGI Global Headquarters in Seoul but is increasingly taking over operational functions.** GGGI is set up to function as a satellite organisation, with country operations drawing on the support of sector experts located at headquarters. This enables the technical backstopping function, which in Indonesia's case is important for all three priority areas (land-use, energy and SEZ). Staff from HQ's Investment and Policy Solutions Division have recently provided extensive support to the Indonesia team in Phase 2 for Outcome 3 (the bankable projects) and Outcome 2 (enabling activities / policy engagement).

The operational support was particularly apparent in Phase 1, as the Indonesian organisation was setting up operations. A process of decentralisation has taken place over the course of Phase 2 and GGGI

Headquarters' support is now increasingly limited to technical backstopping and quality control, as GGGI Indonesia has taken on responsibility for financial management, procurement and contraction of consultants.

The fact that the GGGI Indonesia country representative from 2013 – 2017 is now located at headquarters and is leads technical backstopping for forest and land-use would suggest that collaboration, and GGGI headquarters' ability to service the Indonesian operations, is strong and with potential to be effective. Conversely, it is apparent that the support that GGGI HQ was able to provide in the initial stages of GGGI Indonesia's existence was limited by the fact that it was a newly established organisation (launched in 2012) which had to establish procedures and routines from scratch.

An area of operational support which is still provided and where the value of being part of an international entity is obvious is in the area of risk management, where GGGI Headquarters has developed a project level risk management platform to be used in all its country operations.

### **5.3 The ability of the Indonesia office to convert outputs into tangible outcomes**

**There have been some positive signs of impact at the outcome level, but for the most part they have been limited to GGGI's work with sub-national governments. Generally speaking, it is too early to tell (even for Phase 1) whether the outputs will lead to the intended outcomes. It is possible that GGGI has had unrealistic expectations in this regard and its efforts have been hamstrung by its failure to establish strong relationships at high levels in the Indonesian Government.**

GGGI Indonesia has arguably been able to convert outputs into tangible outcomes in some instances at the sub-national level. For example, green growth has been mainstreamed and integrated in the Medium-Term Management Plan of Central and East Kalimantan, and in the two districts in Central Kalimantan (Murung Raya and Pulang Pisau). However, this not yet happened for national level planning processes.

To a large extent the ability to convert outputs into outcomes will depend on the actions of the Government of Indonesia and other factors beyond the control of GGGI. Despite the assessment by GGGI that the outcomes of Phase 1 were achieved, the adoption of the products from Phase I into Governmental standards and procedures is still in progress. For example, the eCBA tool (Output A1) has been included in the training module for civil servants to be given by LAN but that does not mean that the green growth approaches have been mainstreamed (Outcome A). Moreover, the inclusion of the eCBA tool in Strategic Environment Assessments (SEA) is still being tested in the Special Economic Zones on a voluntary basis but is not yet a standard.

The ability to convert outputs into outcomes also requires that the outcomes that are specified are realistic and achievable. This is an area that GGGI is fully able to control and where it arguably could have done a

better job in Phase 1. If the logframe is not realistic, it becomes a futile exercise and will turn into a source of frustration for GGGI as well as the funding partner. In Phase 1, it appears that several of the expected outcomes - such as *A: green growth approach mainstreamed into planning and investment decision-making process* and *B: strengthened green growth performance of projects and investments* - were far beyond what one could hope to achieve in the initial three-year period (how can one expect projects to perform according to a new metric when the ideas of that metric haven't yet been introduced to decision makers?).

GGGI can also be held partially responsible for the failure to achieve effective relationships at the ministerial (or equivalent) levels in the GoI. In order to penetrate a nation's thinking in terms of growth models, it is fundamental to target, persistently, the highest echelons of the government. While the GoI certainly hasn't been easy to approach, the fact that GGGI has struggled to achieve this – for instance with MoEF – has hampered its ability to affect outcomes.



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## 6 Management Capacity

**GGGI Indonesia is a tightly knit but growing team which relies on consultants to carry out many of its activities and receives management support from its headquarters in Seoul. The team seems to be managing its portfolio of activities well but has had mixed success in achieving the right entry points to the Government.**

GGGI Indonesia has gradually increased its number of staff and in-house experts, now counting 23 and aiming for 37 by the end of 2018. GGGI uses external resources when the required expertise is not available in-house or when a flexible needs-based and time-bound external contract is more optimal. All programme activities are managed in-house, while drawing on a pool of external experts and consultants (so far in Phase 2, a total of 11 firms and 16 consultants have been used). In the mid-term review of Phase 1, it was suggested that managing all the external consultants presented a drain on GGGI staff time. However, GGGI currently seems to be managing the current number of firms and consultants well.

GGGI receives support from its headquarters on strategic issues, in addition to that given on operational and technical levels. This support includes assistance on high-level communication with the Indonesian Government in relation to Indonesia's core contribution and a recent effort of resource mobilisation to diversify GGGI Indonesia's funding base.

After reports of financial irregularities in 2013, GGGI (globally) reacted by putting in place a much more onerous system for managing people and funds. These changes appear in some cases to have led to frustratingly slow administrative processes.

GGGI staff seem to be well qualified for their jobs. On some occasions, the organisation has struggled to attract the right candidates (e.g. several rounds were required before an energy expert could be hired) but we understand that this is usually due to competition in a tight job market rather than a lack of attractiveness of GGGI as a workplace. The Gol appears, on balance, to be happy with the quality of the GGGI staff. There were reportedly some challenges in relation to the staff provided to ESDM in the period 2015-16, but GGGI seems confident that these have now been overcome. FORDIA spoke warmly of the good relations between their staff and GGGI experts.

Despite broadly positive impressions, the review team identified two challenges in relation to staffing that should be monitored going forward: one is the issue of the nationality of senior staff at GGGI. We understand that having a foreign national at the helm of the organisation is seen by some Government officials as a barrier to a close relationship. We also understand that this issue is well understood by the Embassy and possibly GGGI itself but that a limited pool of well qualified national candidates makes this a challenge that is not easily resolved.

Another staffing issue, possibly related to the question of nationality, concerns the level of Indonesian Government officials GGGI manages to engage with. An organisation that wishes to change the mindset of a government would presumably engage at the very highest levels (e.g. president, ministers). While this, at least theoretically, was achieved in Phase 1 as the previous president SBY was a firm supporter of GGGI (and subsequently became President of its governing council), it would seem that GGGI currently struggles to reach the highest echelons of the GoI. To some extent, its association with the previous President is now a handicap. Continuing to aim for strong relationships at the right levels should be a key priority for GGGI going forward.

The relationship between GGGI and the Embassy appears to be very good. In addition to the formal donor meetings, they have regular informal contact as well as opportunities to meet and coordinate within the context of the broader donor community in Jakarta.

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## 7 Results Management

**GGGI's Phase 2 logframe appears overly ambitious in terms of the Outcomes it expects to achieve. However, it is actively used as a monitoring tool and is of a much improved standard compared to the management system used in Phase 1.**

GGGI Indonesia uses a logframe agreed upon with the Norwegian Embassy as its main results management framework. The logframe is used to plan activities and track progress in annual meetings with the Embassy but also in the quarterly meetings held with Bappenas to monitor the progress of activities, outputs and outcomes. GGGI staff actively use the logframe and appear very aware of what outputs and outcomes they are aiming to achieve.

Communication both within GGGI's organisation, with Government partners and with the Embassy appears to be good and conducive to effective results-management. Meetings are held between GGGI-funded staff and Government partners every six weeks to monitor the progress of the programme. Informal communication is also used extensively (WhatsApp, informal meetings, etc.), increasing the likelihood that ongoing tasks and progress are monitored adequately.

The Phase 2 logframe is based on a template from GGGI HQ and of a good standard, even if some of the outcomes seem overly optimistic. For instance, for the energy priority area, the outcome aimed for is 'a systematic enabling approach to encourage green investment is adopted by the relevant Indonesian government authorities'. This is a tall order, given that the renewable energy debate in Indonesia is in its infancy and the entrenched position of the coal industry. To think that there will be a systematic enabling approach to green energy in Indonesia at the end of 2019 thus seems overly optimistic.

The (broadly speaking) good logframe in Phase 2 seems to have been a positive step up from Phase 1. The logframe created for Phase 1 was not in line with international best practice, lacking both details (lack of measurable outcomes) and realism. It is perhaps not surprising that GGGI struggled to produce a robust logframe at that point, as it was just starting operations and lacked experience and systems which could give the required support. Based on input from Bappenas the logframe was amended half way through Phase 1 but even the new version seems to have suffered from some confusion in terms of the logical hierarchy of outcomes, outputs and indicators.

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## 8 Coordination

**GGGI seems genuinely concerned with avoiding duplication of effort and with coordinating its activities with implementing partners, other donors and external stakeholders. Synergies between GGGI's work and other initiatives - including the bilateral Norway-Indonesia funding to reduce deforestation and forest degradation - are slowly emerging.**

GGGI appears to do a respectable job of coordinating the various organisations involved in its activities. For the most part they consist of Government counterpart(s) and a small number of NGOs or external stakeholders. When planning work streams, GGGI as a matter of routine invites external stakeholders to participate. At the national level, GGGI participates in coordination meetings that line ministries organise with the various donors: these appear to be regular in the energy sector, but less so in the forest sector. At the sub-national level, stakeholder meetings are organised by Bappeda, with the support of GGGI, and involves local NGOs, community associations and in some cases the peatland restoration agency (BRG). In Central and East Kalimantan, the strong personal standing and network of the two GGGI leads appears to play a significant role in bringing together the relevant parties and enabling collaboration in a positive atmosphere.

GGGI has been supporting the development of projects to be presented to the World Bank's FCPF. This is one area in which GGGI's activities are building synergies with existing initiatives through its Gol partner (FORDIA). Moreover, the activities in Phase 2 which relate to the development of 'bankable projects' – both in the SEZ workstream and in Central and East Kalimantan – are justified partly in relation to the desire to prepare the ground for the emission reduction-based payments required by the bilateral Norway-Indonesia fund, even if Indonesia's readiness to fully engage is still limited.

The review team was otherwise surprised by the limited number of bilateral donors and NGOs active in the sectors of operation of GGGI. This seems to be particularly true at the provincial and district levels where the team was repeatedly told that GGGI was the only relevant provider of technical support. Thus, to some extent, the task of coordination is made relatively easy by the limited number of parties (it obviously presents other challenges, such as the lack of partners to implement or co-fund activities with).

So far, GGGI seems to have very limited interaction with the private sector. To a large extent this can be explained by the fact that GGGI's focus is on the Gol's planning capabilities; private sector involvement becomes mostly relevant at the later stage of implementing sector strategies or projects (and hence there is some private sector coordination in the workstreams on 'bankable projects' in Phase 2).

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## 9 Risk Management

**GGGI uses a robust risk management framework for its activities, in line with international standards and Government of Indonesia policies. The risks to the cooperation programme with Norway are also actively managed and staff seem conscious of the need for deliberate mitigation strategies vis-à-vis the Gol.**

GGGI's risk management system is based on its own corporate standards and is in line with international best practice. In Phase 1, this system was known as the GGGI Sustainability and Safeguards Policy (SSP) but in the second half of 2016, a more developed Safeguards, Poverty Reduction, and Social Inclusion (SPRSI) framework was introduced. The SPRSI framework is based on GGGI policies and strategies including the Country Planning Framework, donor requirements, and Gol regulations and priorities. The SPRSI framework is GGGI's key framework for risk management and ensures GGGI compliance with international standards on social and environmental safeguards and alignment with Gol's pro-growth, pro-poor, pro-job, and pro-environment development agenda. In day to day operations, risks are managed by the GGGI Indonesia Country Representative and Principal Program Manager.

As for the risks of the programme agreed upon with Norway, these are currently identified and monitored within the Phase II Results Framework. Each outcome, output and activity have a corresponding set of identified risks and risk mitigation measures. Risk management is recorded and reported monthly to GGGI Headquarters, in annual reports to the Embassy, and discussed both in annual meetings and more informal communications with the Embassy.

Perhaps the most important overarching risk to GGGI's likelihood of success in Indonesia is the change in government support after an election. As these happen at regular intervals both at the district, provincial and state levels, GGGI has developed a deliberate strategy of relationship building with government staff at various levels (echelons 1, 2 and 3).

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## 10 Relevance

### 10.1 Is the GGGI programme consistent with Indonesia's requirements at the national and sub-national levels?

**GGGI's programme in Indonesia and Indonesia's climate change commitments have, to a large extent, been developed at the same pace and are closely aligned. Relevance is further enhanced by having GGGI's activities (at least in Phase 2) be driven by requests from the GoI.** Indonesia's NDC, submitted to the UNFCCC in October 2016, confirms Indonesia's commitment to reduce its GHG emissions by 29% against a business as usual scenario by 2030. Emissions reductions in the forest and land use and energy sectors will be necessary to achieve the objectives of the NDC and these are priority areas in GGGI's work programme as well. The NDC commitments are reflected in the national Country Planning Framework (CPF) for the period of 2016-2020, developed with the assistance of GGGI and signed by the Minister for National Development Planning and by the Director General of GGGI.

In Indonesia, priorities and planning frameworks at the national level are cascaded to the provincial and district levels. Through cooperation with Bappenas at the national level and Bappeda at province and district levels, GGGI targets its activities to be in line with the Governments' planning cycles. In this way, GGGI aims for its activities and the needs of the Indonesian governments at all levels to be synchronised.

GGGI's activities in Indonesia are intended to be 'demand-driven' in the sense that GGGI builds its programme of activities around the requests for assistance it receives from the GoI (as coordinated through Bappenas). From what the review team could observe, this approach has been followed in Phase 2, whereas Phase 1 activities – before GGGI and the GoI had established relationships - were primarily identified by GGGI and then proposed to the Indonesian Government.

### 10.2 Is the GGGI programme consistent with the priorities of NICFI?

**The priorities of NICFI are reflected in GGGI's work in Indonesia, but the programme has a much broader sphere of operation than forests and land use and this may create shortcomings in terms of how Norway manages its relationship with GGGI.** NICFI was established in 2008 with three objectives: 1) To contribute to the inclusion of REDD+ under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); 2) To contribute to early actions for measurable emission reductions from deforestation and forest degradation, and; 3) To promote the conservation of primary forests, due to their particular importance as carbon stores and for their biological diversity.

Many of GGGI's activities in Indonesia can be seen to be consistent with these objectives. For instance, GGGI's Phase 2 activity of assisting GoI with developing a pipeline of investable projects is aimed at

releasing some of the funding allocated for emission reductions (USD 1 billion) under the MoU entered into between Norway and Indonesia in 2011. The assistance given by GGGI to develop projects in East Kalimantan for submission to the FCPF can also be said to be directly relevant to NICFI's second objective, while the support for FMUs at the province and district levels are relevant for the third objective.

GGGI's activities are much broader than just forest or land-use, however, as illustrated by the three priority areas of Phase 2 of energy, special economic zones and forest and land-use. While one could (and GGGI does) argue that the work related to special economic zones includes activities related to forest and land-use, and that some of the energy projects GGGI is supporting relate to the forest sector (oil palm effluent, biomass pellets), they are clearly not focused on the narrower objectives of NICFI. In the budget presented to the Embassy for 2017, only 30% is allocated to outputs directly related to forests/land-use (Outputs 1.3, 2.3 and 3.3)<sup>5</sup>. There is thus a disconnect between the narrow funding objectives of NICFI and GGGI's broader area of intervention, which may or may not pose a challenge for NICFI.

GGGI explains that the three priority areas of Phase 2 were arrived at based on the wishes of the GoI. In fact, Bappenas is reportedly more interested in cooperation on energy than on forests or SEZ. The Embassy on the other hand appears to monitor the forest and land-use portfolios of the cooperation programme much more closely than the other two. From a management perspective, this unequal distribution of attention does not seem ideal.

### 10.3 How does the program contribute to the objectives of Indonesia's REDD+ strategy?

**The design of GGGI's programme in Indonesia, including its choice of provinces to collaborate with, are in line with Indonesia's REDD+ strategy. However, the current slow pace of policy developments at the national level as well as a failure to effectively engage leaders in the Ministry of Environment and Forests mean that GGGI's REDD+ activities at the moment are more about treading water than making real progress.**

Indonesia's REDD+ Strategy of 2012 states that 'REDD+ will be applied within the low carbon and green economy framework to ensure that efforts to mitigate land use-driven climate change are carried out in line with Indonesian policies and need for sustainable development'. This is clearly consistent with GGGI's approach of green growth as a framework for development. Moreover, the REDD+ Strategy's short-term goal (up to 2014) referred to 'the strategic improvement of institutions and governance systems, as well as of spatial plans and the investment climate, in order to fulfil Indonesia's commitment to reduce greenhouse gas

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<sup>5</sup> Source: GGGI Indonesia, 'Output Based Budget GGP Phase 2 – 2017'

emissions while maintaining economic growth'. GGGI's secondment of staff and consultants in Indonesian institutions and creation of green growth planning tools during Phase 1 can be seen to be consistent with this goal. The medium- and long-term (up to 2030) goals cover implementation and the aim that Indonesia will turn its forests and land to net carbon sinks, for which GGGI's ongoing work programme of developing 'bankable projects' is highly relevant. At the sub-national levels, Indonesia's REDD+ Strategy selected Central and East Kalimantan as pilot provinces. These are also the two provinces GGGI is focusing its efforts on. Hence, GGGI's programme can be seen to be highly consistent with Indonesia's REDD+ Strategy.

There is, however, precious little going on in relation to Indonesia's REDD+ strategy at the moment. A few components, such as MRV, are pending official sign-off from the Minister but there is also a general attitude of 'wait-and-see' while political leadership changes are taking place in MoEF. In addition, GGGI appears to struggle to get through to decision makers in the Ministry<sup>6</sup>. It appears that the lack of engagement by the Directorate General for Climate Change within MoEF is not limited to GGGI (the Norwegian Embassy also suffers from this) but if GGGI's work is to become effective in influencing Indonesia's REDD+ strategy going forward, this is a relationship that must be fixed.

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<sup>6</sup> The failure of the review team to secure a meeting with DGCC during its visit to Jakarta, despite repeated attempts by GGGI, can be seen as symptomatic of this lack of engagement (even if this can be partly blamed on the change in leadership taking place in DGCC around the time of the review team's visit)



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## 11 Gender

**GGGI's work programme has increased its emphasis on gender over time, but the issue does not appear to be a priority for the GoI and hence has limited visibility in GGGI's joint activities with the Government.**

Gender is a cross-cutting theme in GGGI's programme of work and strategy globally and a part of its safeguarding framework (SPRSI). However, the mid-term review of 2014 found that GGGI Indonesia had no explicit gender-focused interventions, apart from collecting data on the gender of those attending GGGI events (workshops). The Review recommended designing the Phase 2 Framework to be gender sensitive from the outset. The Logframe for Phase 2 contains mention of gender for two of the Outputs (Output 2.4 - green growth tool - and Output 4.3 - green growth curriculum) but provides no specifics on activities or implementation. The Phase 2 progress report from January 2018 mentions the inclusion of gender in the provincial energy plans (RUEDs) that GGGI is supporting but also points to the lack of gender mainstreaming in Indonesian policies (for the National Designated Authority, for instance). Hence, it seems that GGGI's Indonesia programme has become more gender aware over time, but that the extent to which the issue gains traction in outputs and activities depends to a large extent on the receptiveness of the Government partners – which until now seems to have been low.

The review team recommends that GGGI continue emphasising gender in their work, whenever feasible and relevant. This is particularly likely to be the case at the provincial and district levels through stakeholder processes. For instance, GGGI should continue ensuring women and women's groups are invited to meetings and given the opportunity to influence regional development plans.

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## 12 Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations

**There are several features of the way in which GGGI operates in Indonesia which deserve special mention. One is the operational model of ‘embedding’.** This was a deliberate strategy by GGGI from the beginning, the idea being that the ability to influence as well as build capacity is enhanced by having GGGI personnel working alongside civil servants. Several GGGI staff are currently based in the offices of line ministries, including Bappenas. It appears, however, that the extent of real collaboration and the welcome extended to GGGI staff varies from ministry to ministry. Hence it might be too early to point to ‘proof’ that the embedding model works, even if it appeals intuitively.

**A related feature of ‘best practice’ is GGGI’s equally deliberate approach of working at several levels of a ministry simultaneously.** Working at different staff levels gives GGGI the opportunity to influence thinking and skills both in management and technical functions. This seems like a crucial strategy when trying to reach the ambitious goal of changing a government’s mindset from ‘business as usual’ to ‘green’. Collaborating at different echelons of a ministry is also a useful way of mitigating risk – staff turnover is less likely to have fatal consequences, and increasing sustainability – the opportunity to influence long-term thinking is greater the more numerous the channels of influence. GGGI staff routinely quoted a ministry’s echelons (1, 2, 3 etc.) and the staff currently occupying these positions, demonstrating that this way of working is well understood and supported in the organisation.

**At the sub-national level, GGGI has been able to provide continuity, which seems to at least partly explain its achievements.** Both in Central and East Kalimantan, GGGI’s programme has been able to operate and make progress both in Phase 1 and Phase 2. It was pointed out to the review team on several occasions that GGGI’s presence and perseverance was a much-valued feature in a donor landscape which otherwise often changes. The continuous presence of GGGI has enabled the building of trust between itself and Bappeda, the FMUs and other stakeholders, which has positively influenced results.

**A lesson learned from GGGI’s existence in Indonesia so far is that gaining an effective foothold in the political establishment in Indonesia is a challenging and time-consuming endeavour, especially for a new and foreign organisation.** Activities in Phase 1 were slow to take off for practical and political reasons – despite the backing of the then-president. Also, in Phase 2 quite a lot of the progress GGGI is able to make will depend on its ability to operate effectively in an environment which may still view it with a fair amount of scepticism (to what some may see as interference with national sovereignty). There are several reasons for GGGI’s greater success at the provincial level relative to the national, but having local, good-quality and well-connected staff has certainly helped. To the extent that GGGI at the national level is still seen as a politically linked and non-Indonesian entity, its work will continue to face challenges.

**Another lesson learned is that it was brave and perhaps premature of Norway to fund GGGI at the scale that it did in Phase 1.** GGGI did not have a track record – internationally or locally – and some of the challenges it encountered could probably have been predicted and mitigated if a proper assessment had been undertaken at the outset. We understand that the decision to fund GGGI Indonesia was part of a broader endorsement by Norway of GGGI globally and that it went ahead despite serious reservations by the Embassy (especially the Counsellor). The large amount of funding may in part explain the overly optimistic outcomes GGGI then set itself out to achieve. A better reasoned and more gradual deployment of funds might have achieved greater results and created fewer frustrations.

## Recommendations

**Looking ahead, we have identified four main challenges and corresponding recommendations for GGGI in Indonesia.**

**One is whether GGGI should work in depth on certain issues – as it appears to be increasingly doing - or stay true to its mission of being a high-level influencer.** In Phase 2, much of GGGI's work has been project- focused. For instance, it has produced feasibility studies for different renewable energy technologies and for commodities that can thrive on peatlands. If correctly chosen, these can be worthwhile activities and from what we understand they are a result of specific requests from the Indonesian Government. GGGI argues that in order to convince the Government of the virtues of green growth, it has to show concrete examples of what such growth looks like. These are valid arguments, but only to the extent that these activities don't detract from GGGI's efforts to continue influencing political and planning processes, such as showcasing the eCBA tools, advocating policy change, and introducing the concept of green growth to other sectors such as transport. It is not clear to the review team whether this is currently the case.

**The next challenge is linked to the first: GGGI has limited resources and cannot – and should not – try to do everything.** Feasibility studies are a natural and important element of implementing new technologies but there are a host of organisations (World Bank, the UN, private entities) that can fill that niche, while only GGGI is aiming to fill the niche of high-level influencer. Even when GGGI hires consultants to carry out the brunt of the project work, it is still responsible for managing the process and in some cases seems fairly involved in executing the work. Ideally, GGGI would create the conditions for such project work to be relevant, but let other organisations step in to carry out and monitor that work. We understand that in some cases (at the province and district levels in particular) there are simply no other relevant organisations present to continue GGGI's work, but we would encourage GGGI and the Embassy to monitor the situation and engage other stakeholders to support it with implementation activities whenever possible. It is also important to ensure that feasibility studies have the intended impact. If carried out systematically and linked to policy advocacy efforts, they may be very effective. But one-off efforts that are not properly embedded or thought through can be a waste of resources. One way of improving the likelihood of success is to channel feasibility studies through a project preparation facility, which incorporates robust procedures and follow-up

actions<sup>7</sup>. GGGI should explore whether elements from such an approach can be adopted in their project work, or if they can link up with other donors to offload the responsibility for such work.

**In order to achieve its mission, GGGI has to become more successful in gaining entry to the highest echelons of the Indonesian Government.** The growth model that Indonesia follows in the coming decades will be determined by the mindset of the President and the most important line ministries, including the Ministry of Finance. It follows that GGGI will only succeed in its mission if it achieves influence at the highest levels of Government. On this account, GGGI still has some way to go as its influence at the presidential level at the moment seems very limited: contact with the Ministry of Finance is only tentative so far and its record in terms of creating a real partnership at the highest levels in MoEF and even Bappenas seems mixed. GGGI should think deeply, strategically and politically about what it can do to achieve the national level advisory role it was intended to have.

**Finally, GGGI's Indonesia operations have to continue focusing on the forest and land-use sector.** This sector is undoubtedly a very important area for GGGI at the moment, but the Gol's requests are much broader and run the risk of distracting GGGI's attention. While there is merit in GGGI's activities being demand-led and the Norwegian Embassy is understanding of the need to bring in the broader context of green growth, it would be wise for GGGI to adjust course – whenever possible – to tailor as much of its work to be relevant to its funder's focus.

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<sup>7</sup> Internationally, the World Bank, ADB, GCF and others have such facilities. The extent to which they exist in Indonesia is not known.

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# Annex 1 Terms of Reference

## Background

### The GoI-GGGI Collaboration

The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) is an interdisciplinary, multi-stakeholder international organization, dedicated to pioneering a new model of economic growth, known as "green growth". Such a model simultaneously targets economic performance, environmental sustainability and social inclusion.

Indonesia is a founding member of GGGI and signed the GGGI Establishment Agreement in September 2012. In October 2012, an inter-ministerial meeting appointed the Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) as GGGI's focal point in Indonesia. Indonesia became a full member of GGGI in September 2014, when the government formally deposited its ratification of the GGGI Establishment Agreement.

Prior to change in administration in 2014, the Government of Indonesia's focal point was BAPPENAS, while the key implementing partners included the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs (CMEA), UKP4, REDD+ Agency, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (outside the scope of this specific 'Project'), and the Regional Planning Agencies (BAPPEDA) in Central Kalimantan and East Kalimantan Provinces. With a change in administration, which resulted in reorganization of several institutions governing natural resources; disbandment of UKP4 and REDD+ Agency and establishment of Directorate General for Climate Change under the Ministry for Environment and Forest in particular, the programme has experienced coordination issues.

By end of the first phase, GGGI's governmental partners in Indonesia included BAPPENAS, the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs (CMEA), Ministry of Environment and Forest, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and the Regional Planning Agencies (BAPPEDA) in Central Kalimantan and East Kalimantan.

The initial objective of the program was "to promote Green Growth in Indonesia which recognises the value of natural capital, improves resilience, builds local economies and is inclusive and equitable." The objective was to be achieved through three work streams, which are mainstreaming green growth into planning process, REDD+ for Green Growth, and prioritizing and implementing green growth at sub national level (Central and East Kalimantan).

However, based on intensive consultations with the Government of Indonesia and GGGI's change in implementation approach, there have been slight adjustments to the program's planned impacts and outcomes. GGGI proposed to amend the programme's objectives to reflect a more holistic approach to economic growth in the context of sustainable development.

In 2014, GGGI introduced a 'value chain' approach to better articulate the breadth of products and services provided to the Government of Indonesia, and adjusted its programmatic objective into the following:

The Goal of the Phase I Programme is to mainstream green growth in Indonesia's economic planning process, both at national and provincial levels, and to integrate the REDD+ program into a much wider green growth approach that should sit at the core of the economic planning process in the country. This objective would be achieved by the following outcomes:

- to improve understanding of green growth opportunities in the context of existing economic planning process,
- to accelerate REDD+ pilot delivery mechanism,
- to strengthen capacity at provincial level to implement key pilots in the short term and
- to enhance capacity in the government to put together a green growth program at scale in the medium and long run.

The programme was initially planned as a two-year programme (2012-2014), for which Norway committed to contribute a maximum amount of 35.6 Million NOK. Due to change in administration, which resulted in re-arrangement of institutions that govern natural resources management, and therefore impacted implementation of the programme, Norway approved GGGI's request for extension with additional cost of 20.99 Million and prolonged implementation period to end of 2015.

In November 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to continue supporting GGGI Indonesia, and committed support for 3 years to undertake phase II. GGGI Programme in Indonesia adjusted its outcome of Phase II into the following:

- Green Growth Plan and strategies related to energy, special economic zones, forest and land-based mitigation, and across sectors are adopted by relevant Indonesian government authorities
- A systematic enabling approach to encourage green investment is adopted by relevant Indonesian government authorities
- Increased green investment is directed to focal sectors
- A green growth facility supports well informed national and sub national decision makers within capable institutions to understand, replicate and scale up green growth approaches.

For the initiation of Phase II, GGGI has obtained support from their government's partner. Some of them; the Minister of Bappenas, the Secretary General of the Environment and Forestry, the Deputy for Education and Capacity Building of State Administration Agency and from head of Provincial Planning office of East Kalimantan have written endorsement letters to the Institute. Of these, the State Administration Agency and Papua Province are additional government partners for the new phase.

## Objectives of the Review

Norway commissioned a mid-term review of phase 1, aimed to assess the progress of programmatic implementation and to make necessary adjustment based upon the findings. The Embassy used results and recommendations of this review for the appraisal of the GGGI Phase II proposal. This mid-term review was conducted by LTS International and was completed in May 2014.

Norway is now commissioning a review of GGGI's work in Indonesia so far. The review will include:

- a) The Final Review of GGGI Phase I Programme. This review will assess the programmatic achievements of the programme and the impacts it has generated against the revised logical (result) framework. The review shall cover the total implementation period of phase I, which is from 2012 to 2015.
- b) The Mid-Term Review of GGGI Phase II. This review shall assess the programmatic achievements of the programme against the logical framework, and shall cover the implementation period from November 2015 to June 2017.

## Scope of Work

The review shall include the issues of efficiency, management capacity, achievement of results, relevance, sustainability, impact, sustainability, risks management, human rights and gender, lessons learned and best practices.

- Efficiency: An assessment of how efficient the programme is in converting inputs into outputs. Assessment of the benefits of GGGI Indonesia being part of a global institution (GGGI), and the ability of the Indonesia office to convert objectives into tangible outcomes.
- Management capacity: An assessment of GGGI Indonesia's administrative and management capacity, including collaboration and support from GGGI HQ in terms of management and strategic thinking.
- Achievements of results: An assessment of to which extent the programme's purpose and goal have been achieved, particularly the integration of GGGI's work streams and outputs into national and subnational policy development processes in Indonesia.
- Results management: An assessment of GGGI Indonesia's results management, including the realism and the clarity of the programme's expected results; GGGI Indonesia's system for monitoring of results (including indicators and sources used); system for results assessment and reporting (including the quality of its reports); reason for and process of revising its results framework.
- Sustainability. An assessment of the probability of continued long-term benefits after the closing of the programme and the ownership of the results from the partner country. Does GGGI Indonesia apply social and environmental safeguards in its program?
- Relevance. An assessments of to which extent the programme is consistent with the beneficiaries' requirements, national and subnational policies in Indonesia, country needs, global priorities and partners' and Norway's priorities as indicated in its Forest and Climate Initiative and Norwegian development policies. How does the program contribute to the objectives of the Indonesia REDD+ strategy?
- Coordination. An assessment of how the programme interacts and collaborates with other Norway funded programmes, and with programmes supported by other donors and other related initiatives

for natural resources governance. Also on added value of the Indonesia country programme on creating synergies with the activities already undertaken by the partner government, private sector actors and civil society organisations in Indonesia.

- Risks Management. An assessment of GGGI Indonesia's risk management systems; and assessment of the programme's response to risks, both internal and external, including corruption.
- Gender. An assessment of how gender issues are integrated in the programme operations.
- Human Rights. An assessment of means/ approach by which GGGI Indonesia addresses human rights issues
- Lessons Learned and Best Practices. An assessment of lessons learned from the implementation, what could have been done, reflection and comparison with example of other practices in different geography.

## Implementation approach

### Desk Review

Desk review of the outputs and other documents; policy and strategy, reviews/evaluations, annual reports, official minutes from meetings, website and other internet applications, relevant official documents, resulting from the implementation of the programme. The Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta, the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment and Norad would facilitate access to relevant documents to the extent possible.

### Field Visit

In order to obtain, verify and get inputs from relevant stakeholders, the review shall include a field visit to Jakarta, as well as provinces and regions in Central Kalimantan and East Kalimantan. (Details, tbd). The field visit should include interview with the following key actors:

- GGGI Indonesia's management and staff, including key staff at GGGI HQ (via telecommunication); central, provincial and district
- Government Partners of GGGI Indonesia and project target groups (implementing partner, and key stakeholders)
- Norwegian Embassy; other donors and implementing agencies of relevant or similar programs in Indonesia.

### Timetable for preparation, fieldwork and reporting

- The assignment shall be carried out in the second half of 2017.
- The work shall be carried out within a period of a maximum four weeks, including 1 week of document review and eventual telecommunication with key actors prior to the field visit, 8 days of fieldwork, and 2 weeks for preparing the draft and final report.
- *The review team shall present preliminary findings to the Norwegian Embassy and GGGI Indonesia immediately after the end of the fieldwork.*
- *One week after finalization of the fieldwork, a draft report shall be presented to Norad, Oslo, the Norwegian Embassy and GGGI Indonesia, Indonesia. Comments shall be submitted one week after*



*receipt of the report to the review team. The Final Report shall be presented one week after receipt of comments.*

- *The report shall not exceed 30 pages, not including annexes, and contain an executive summary of 3-5 pages with the main findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations.*
- *The report has to address and discuss all of the issues raised in the ToR.*
- *The report shall be written in English.*

## **Budget**

NICFI shall cover all direct relevant expenses of this review.

## Annex 2: List of Interviews

Organisation	Name and position	Date of interview
In-person interviews in Indonesia		
Embassy of Norway	<p>Øyvind Dahl, Counsellor – Climate and Forest</p> <p>Susilo A. Kuncoro - Advisor for Forestry and Climate Change</p> <p>Christoffer Grønstad - Counsellor – Climate Change and Forest</p>	January 22
GGGI Indonesia, Jakarta office	<p>Marcel Silvius, Country Representative</p> <p>Dagmar Zwebe, Principal Program Manager</p> <p>Yonata M. Syarief, Senior Officer – Operations</p> <p>Benjamin Tular, Senior Officer – Forest and Land Use</p> <p>Tim Jessop, GG Specialist</p> <p>Kurnya Roesad, Senior Officer – SEZ</p>	January 22
BRG (Peat Restoration Agency)	Budi S. Wardhana, BRG Deputy of Planning and Cooperation	January 23
Bappenas	<p>Arifin Rudiyanto, Deputy of Natural Resources and Maritime Affairs</p> <p>J. Rizal Primana, Director of Energy, Mineral Resources and Mining</p> <p>Nizhar Marizi, Deputy Director for Clean Energy and Energy Conservation</p> <p>Teni Widuriyanti, Director of Planning and Development of Development Funding</p>	January 23

FORDIA (MoEF)	Syaiful Anwar, Director of P3SEKPI Niken Sakuntaladewi, ACIAR Project Leader/former FCPF Project Leader	January 24
CMEA and DNKEK	Wahyu Utomo, Deputy Minister for Infrastructure Acceleration and Regional Development  Edib Muslim, Advisor  Bambang Wijanarko, Information Management Division Head, DN KEK	January 24
GGGI Indonesia, Central Kalimantan office	Hendrik Segah, CK Representative Eko Setiabudi, Senior Assistant CK Amalia Dwi Marseva, Senior Associate – Environmental Economist	January 25
DINAS (ESDM), Central Kalimantan	Ms. Eridani, Head of Energy & Electricity Division  Oskar, Sub-head of NRE Division	January 25
USAID Lestari and WWF	Mr. Fatkurrohman, USAID Lestari Officer  Mr. Okta Simon, Act. Project Leader WWF Indonesia CK	January 25
Bappeda (Central Kalimantan)	Ir. Langen Budi Harjo, Head of Economic & Cooperation Division of CK BAPPEDA	January 26
DINAS (Kehutanan/Forestry), Central Kalimantan	Agung Catur Prabowo, Head of Planning and Utilization of Forest Areas Division, CK Forestry Service	January 26
Bappeda (Pulang Pisau)	Gintho, Head of Research and Development  Dhany Kuncorojati, Sub-head of R&D	January 26
Bappeda (Murung Raya)	Nyarutono Tunjan, Head of MR Bappeda  Arief Hidayat, Secretary of MR Bappeda	January 26

University of Palangka Raya	Dr. Renhart Jemi, Forestry expert from Department of Forestry, Faculty of Agriculture	January 26
World Resources Institute (Jakarta)	Koni Samadhi, Director	January 29
By telephone		
GGGI Headquarters	Annawati van Padden	February 1
GGGI Indonesia, East Kalimantan office	Daddy Ruhyat, EK representative	January 31
GGGI Headquarters	Per Bertilsson	February 2
NICFI	Hege Ragnhildstveit	November 14, 2017
Rainforest Foundation Norway	Anja Lillegraven	November 17
Bernd Cordes	Moore Foundation	November 20
Dewi Suralaga	CLUA Indonesia	January 11

## Annex 3

**Table 3 Budget and actual spending GGGI, year-on/year**

<b>Phase I</b>					
	Fiscal Year	2013	2014	2015	Total
Budget (US\$)		3,556,987	3,927,416	915,934	6,361,114
Actual Expenses (US\$)		1,517,764	3,134,409	760,635	5,412,808
Percentage		43%	80%	83%	85%
Balance for the year (US\$)		2,039,223	793,007	155,299	
Carried-over amount to next year (US\$)			2,039,223	793,007	
Additional amount (US\$)			1,888,193	122,927	
Total amount budgeted (US\$)		3,556,987	3,927,416	915,934	
<b>Phase II</b>					
	Fiscal Year	2016	2017	2018	Total
Budget (US\$)		3,817,965	5,578,494		8,037,385
Actual Expenses (US\$)		2,458,891	3,958,810		6,417,701
Percentage		64%	71%		80%
Balance for the year (US\$)		1,359,074	1,619,684		
Carried-over amount to next year (US\$)			1,359,074		
Additional amount (US\$)			4,219,420		
Total amount budgeted (US\$)		3,817,965	5,578,494		

Source: GGGI Indonesia, 2018 (data processed).

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